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Chapter Four
Donald Trump, Twitter, and Islamophobia: The End of Dignity in Presidential
Rhetoric about Terrorism
Presidential rhetoric is critically important in guiding American foreign and
domestic policy as well as in determining which threats are pursued by the U.S.
government1. After the September 11 attacks, terrorism was touted as a threat that
would “never again” be ignored. This threat was repeatedly harped on by Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. After Bush set the agenda for an expansive terror
war and a presidential rhetoric replete with fear, Obama attempted to recalibrate and
narrow the war on terror but ended up largely maintaining Bush’s policies and falling
into some of Bush’s rhetoric regarding the terror threat.
President Donald Trump, who campaigned viciously against Obama’s legacy,
also did not change much in terms of terrorism policy. Even so, the rhetoric adopted by
Trump has upended decades of presidential decorum and dignity in the way he speaks
about terrorists and the brazen way he links terrorism to the negatives he attaches to
immigration. President Trump is unscrupulous in his open dislike of Muslims and
readily equates them with terrorists. Of a “caravan” of immigrants coming from Central
America through Mexico to the United States in October and November 2018, President
Trump made sure to emphasize, with no evidence whatsoever, that there were “Middle
Easterners” among them 2. During a Republican Party Presidential Primary Debate
candidate Donald Trump, the future President of the United States, repeatedly declared
“Islam hates us” 3. On January 18th, 2019, Trump related the following incendiary tweet:
“Border rancher: ‘We’ve found prayer rugs out here. It’s unreal.’-Washington Examiner.
People coming across the Southern Border from many countries, some of which would
be a big surprise” 4.
President Trump, unlike his predecessors, brazenly linked the Muslim religion to
terrorism. He also linked counterterrorism and Islamophobia to his anti-immigration
stance. To this end, Trump unjustifiably merged the “threats” of immigration and of
terrorism.
President Trump has chosen terrorism, and laws and regulations meant to stop
terrorism, as a central plank in his campaign and presidency. Yet he has focused almost
exclusively on threats emanating from Muslim sources, which he has claimed need to
be “looked into,” while ignoring terrorist attacks orchestrated by non-Muslims in
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America and abroad including the spate of attacks by far-right white extremists that
occurred under his watch.
This chapter shows how President Trump’s words about national security
threats, when critically examined, serve to marginalize Muslim and immigrant
populations. In order to better understand how the terror threat, and its definition, has
evolved since 9/11 this chapter will compare Trump’s statements with Obama’s and
George W. Bush’s using the content analysis database of presidential speeches on
terrorism gathered by the author and his research team. Since the focus of Trump’s
rhetoric will be on terrorism, more attention will be paid to his anti-Muslim statements,
though, because Trump links terrorism to immigration, some of his statements against
immigrants will be covered as well. Here it is important to note that to President Trump
a reason to fear immigrants is that they could be terrorists, particularly if they are
Muslims. In this way, Trump merges the terror threat with his xenophobic platform.
So far we have seen that terrorism is repeatedly brought up as a primary concern
in presidential speeches when leaders are trying to sell a specific policy or (re-)set the
political agenda, such as when the Iraq War or troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
were successfully sold to the public and Congress. Presidential rhetoric shapes the
terror threat, giving everyday Americans an image of who to fear and an idea of how
concerned they should be with the goal of affecting legislative and regulatory change.
But, with President Trump, it does this at the grave expense of the rights of American
Muslims.
Trump and the End of Dignity
The President, of course, can use his or her rhetorical might to unite or divide the
country. In this respect, President Trump is a great outlier in American history. Trump
began his term by speaking of “American carnage” at his inauguration, describing the
most powerful and richest country in the world as a dilapidated wasteland where
political elites benefit at the expense of the “forgotten” man and woman5. This populist
speech, after a decidedly populist campaign marked by themes of xenophobia and antiestablishment politics, began a presidency like none other.
When one speaks of dignity, human rights immediately come to mind. The
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that the, “recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” 6. Thomas
Pogge writes that dignity is an attribute of something but not a thing that exists on its
5
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own. In one sense, it is an inalienable attribute of human beings. In another, it is
something that needs to be protected 7. Dignity confers a right. The right to be valued.
The right to be treated with honor and respect. The concept of dignity forms the basis of
our fundamental human rights, which, invented though some believe them to be 8,
endow our social world with the human values of respect, compassion, and pride.
President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, particularly when directed against Muslims,
demarcates a new era in presidential speech-making. An era where Muslims and
immigrants are not treated with the requisite dignity afforded them by their human and
domestic rights and by the values the United States claims to uphold. As Jeffrey Tulis
writes, “Before Donald Trump, America had never elected a demagogue.” Andrew
Johnson serves as the only exception—yet he was not elected, having come to power
after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln—and Johnson “served in a political order
that opposed every one of his important initiatives, overruled his vetoes, impeached
him, and drove him from office in disgrace” 9. Tulis’ description of Johnson’s oratory
eerily conjures Trump: “In the typical speech, Johnson would begin by disclaiming an
intention to speak, proceed to invoke the spirits of Washington and Jackson, claim his
own devotion to the principles of the Union, deny that he was a traitor as others
alleged, attack some part of the audience (depending on the kinds of heckles he
received), defend his use of the veto, attack Congress as a body and single out particular
congressmen (occasionally denouncing them as traitors for not supporting his policies),
compare himself to Christ and offer himself as a martyr, and finally conclude by
declaring his closeness to the people and appealing for their support” 10. “Nothing could
be further” from the vision the Founders had for the presidency than to have a leader
whose power derives from “the interplay of orator and crowd.” “This interplay,” Tulis
states, “may or may not persuade the immediate audience, but the effect of such activity
upon the president’s office, upon his dignity, upon his future ability to persuade, and
upon the deliberative process as a whole is likely to be deleterious” 11. One of Johnson’s
charges for impeachment was, after all, “bad and improper rhetoric”12. While Johnson’s
purpose of rousing public opinion is commonplace today, his inflammatory rhetoric
still is not totally accepted—albeit with the dramatic exception of Donald Trump 13.
Donald Trump overturns centuries of American Presidential norms. He does not
“toggle” between going public and the traditional bargaining presidential role. Instead,
he permanently campaigns. As Trump said one month into his tenure, “For me, [the
7
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presidency] is a campaign” 14. “Trump did not simply import techniques of
campaigning into the governing phase,” Tulis writes, “he continued the actual
campaign past inauguration as he continued to attack his former opponent and
repeatedly lectured audiences, ranging from foreign leaders to the career staff of the
CIA, on the details of his electoral college victory” 15. In the first year of his presidency,
he had his campaign operatives, such as Stephen Bannon and Stephen Miller, craft
policy 16—a practice he continues. Trump turned his inaugural address into a campaign
rally 17. Instead of deferring to the Constitution, which he didn’t mention at all, Trump
referred to the people who support him—“a subset of the American people…that he
invests with the authority of the whole people” as demagogues do.
Additionally, Trump vilifies the media (calling it “the enemy of the people”) and
“pledges his allegiance to the people directly” 18. Twitter enables the President to speak
to the public directly, effectively going “over the heads” of his political opponents and
the mainstream media 19. This direct line is deeply corrosive to the institution of
democracy as it creates a scenario where a demagogic leader and his direct followers
rule in opposition to the so-called Washington elites. This quest has been explicitly
outlined by Stephen Bannon in his goal of dismantling the so-called “deep state”20.
Trump and Going Public: A Tweetstorm against Muslims and Immigrants
At a conference after I presented work on this project, a co-panelist commented
that Donald Trump’s speech cannot be evaluated in the same way as previous
presidents since he speaks off the cuff so frequently and uses social media so heavily 21.
While other presidents have been informal in their speech and have spoken directly to
their bases at times, Donald Trump has taken informality and speaking to his most loyal
followers to new heights. In particular, Trump shrewdly (some might say haphazardly,
but the method seems to be effective) uses Twitter to rile up his most ardent supporters
and to let them know his feelings and intentions outside of his formal speech-making.
These tweets have the same effect on his followers as social media posts by celebrities
have on their fans, they create a deeper bond between leader and follower as they
provide a window into the “real,” “behind the scenes” world of the President. This
informal, highly personal connection drives Trump’s popularity among his supporters.
Yet, he uses this connection to make highly incendiary comments. Trump, moreso than
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even Bush with his connection of bin Laden and Saddam, frequently constructs an
alternate reality from his words that has no grounding in fact or empirics.
Jeffrey Tulis emphasizes the importance of Twitter and loose, informal speech to
Trump’s presidency. Trump’s norm-breaking, Tulis argues, is without precedent—he,
for instance, is not concerned with sounding “presidential” or modelling good behavior
for others22. To this end, as the conference co-panelist rightfully averred, Trump’s
political communication needs to be examined differently than that of others since he
communicates with his supporters directly through tweets and rallies. President Trump
exemplifies the greatest fear of the Founders: “a corrosive leader posing an existential
threat to the constitutional order” 23. The rise of Twitter as a quasi-official form of
presidential pronouncement, Tulis contends, is “evidence of constitutional decay” 24.
The content of Trump’s speech, not just his delivery method, is much different
than that of his predecessors. President Trump famously does not apologize for gaffes
or misstatements25. Instead, he charges his accusers of employing “fake news,” or
doubles down on his words, or “counter punches” by going on the offensive against his
accusers. Samuel Kernell worried that modern presidents might mistake bad news for
bias and seek public relations success rather than problem solving 26. He was also
concerned about presidents pandering to the public 27. Trump goes much further than
these concerns. He panders directly to his base and calls the media “the enemy of the
people” 28.
Trump’s use of Twitter is deeply connected to his political outsider status. The
rise of the “outsider” President, today exemplified by Donald Trump but earlier
epitomized by Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, has made going public a more
popular choice as the intricacies of bargaining with elites are less attractive to leaders
who view themselves as outsiders 29. A central problem with “going public,” Kernell
argues, is that a government predicated on bargaining relies upon trust and reciprocity
for accomplishing its tasks 30. Going public erodes that trust and reciprocity. We see this
erosion of the bargaining process under Trump, who is more than willing to berate his
opponents publicly.
Tulis concludes that Trump “demonstrat[es] no understanding of governance
other than a personal communion between the leader and his followers” 31. He further
notes that Trump fulfills Michael Signer’s four criteria of a demagogue: (1) he fashions
himself as a man of the people opposed to elites; (2) his politics depend upon “a
powerful, visceral connection with the people”; (3) he manipulates this connection for
22
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his own gain; and (4) he does not respect established rules of conduct. Through this
process the demagogue presents “the enthusiasm of a faction” as “the will of the
people” 32.
Donald Trump weaves Islamophobia with anti-immigrant invective in his
tweets. For instance, on October 22, 2018 he tweeted: “You’re going to find MS-13,
you’re going to find Middle Eastern, you’re going to find everything. And guess what,
we’re not allowing them in our country. We want safety, we want safety” 33. That same
day he posted the following: “Sadly, it looks like Mexico’s Police and Military are
unable to stop the Caravan heading to the Southern Border of the United States.
Criminals and unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in. I have alerted Border Patrol
and Military that this is a National [Emergency]. Must change laws!” 34. In April of 2019,
Trump targeted US Representative Ilhan Omar with an image of the twin towers
burning 35. In August of 2017, he tweeted suggesting that a General Pershing’s tactics
against terrorists would be effective. The apocryphal tale holds that Pershing dipped
bullets in pig’s blood or perhaps buried those his unit killed with pig remains to insult
the sensibilities and religious values of his Muslim enemies 36. Finally, on July 14, 2019
he directed his Islamophobia at four first-year congresswomen (two of whom are
Muslim) in the following tweet, “So interesting to see ‘Progressive’ Democrat
Congresswomen, who originally came from countries whose governments are a
complete and total catastrophe, the worst, most corrupt and inept anywhere in the
world (if they even have a functioning government at all).... and viciously telling the
people of the United States, the greatest and most powerful Nation on earth, how our
government is to be run. Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and
crime infested places from which they came. Then come back and show us how.... it is
done. These places need your help badly, you can’t leave fast enough. I’m sure that
Nancy Pelosi would be very happy to quickly work out free travel arrangements!” 37.
Here the President of the United States is essentially telling members of Congress, three
of whom were born in the U.S. all of whom are citizens, to “go back” to where they
came from.
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How Trump Employs Presidential Rhetoric: Islamophobia and Demagoguery
Donald Trump began his anti-Muslim stance well before he even campaigned for
President. Brian Klass in The Washington Post notes that, “In 2011 and 2012, Trump
insinuated that President Barack Obama was secretly a Muslim” 38. For instance, on
March 30, 2011, Trump said the following about Barack Obama in a radio interview: “he
doesn’t have a birth certificate, or if he does, there’s something on that certificate that is
very bad for him. Now, somebody told me—and I have no idea if this is bad for him or
not, but perhaps it would be—that where it says ‘religion,’ 39 it might have ‘Muslim’” 40.
Here Trump trades in the terribly racist “birther” conspiracy theory, adding an
Islamophobic dimension. Trump’s equivocations as to whether being Muslim would be
“a bad thing or not” simply add an element of plausible deniability lest he be
challenged on a statement that is obviously anti-Muslim. Implying that the President is
a Muslim and that that is a bad thing is tantamount to bigotry toward Muslims.
On the campaign trail, Trump’s Islamophobia continued. On November 21, 2015,
Trump claimed that he “watched when the World Trade Center came tumbling down
[on 9/11]. And I watched in Jersey City, New Jersey, where thousands and thousands
of people were cheering as that building came down.” When he was challenged by ABC
News regarding that statement the next day, Trump did not relent, saying, “It was well
covered at the time. There were people over in New Jersey that were watching it, a
heavy Arab population, that were cheering as the buildings came down. Not good” 41.
On March 9, 2016, Trump declared the following: “I think Islam hates us…There’s a
tremendous hatred. We have to get to the bottom of it”42. When asked on March 29,
2016 whether he trusts American Muslims Trump said, “Many of them I do, and some, I
guess, we don’t” 43. On April 28, 2016, echoing the language of President George W.
Bush before him, Trump stated that, “‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’ has inherited the title
of the ‘threat (that) challenges our world’ from ‘Fascism, Nazism and Communism’” 44.
This is obviously a false equivalency, Nazis and Communist totalitarians killed millions
38
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of people in the 20th century, terrorist non-state actors or even state-supported terrorists
have killed a few orders of magnitude fewer people. On June 15, 2016, contra to very
strong evidence to the contrary, Trump stated that Muslims who immigrate to the
United States do not assimilate saying: “Assimilation has been very hard. It’s almost—I
won’t say nonexistent, but it gets to be pretty close” 45. On August 15, 2016, Trump
declared “radical Islamic terrorism” an existential threat. He went on to say that the
media ignores or “doesn’t want to report” on this matter because it is “very, very
dishonest” 46—and also presumably because it is pro-Muslim.
Khan, et al. note that Trump’s Islamophobia did not occur in a bubble. Other
Republican candidates got in on the act. Dr. Ben Carson called Islam “inconsistent” with
the American Constitution. Ted Cruz echoed Trump’s call for an immigration ban on
Muslims 47. Going further back, the 2012 election saw the Democrats pitted against a
Republican party that was decidedly Islamophobic. Mitt Romney suggested that Islam
may not be compatible with democracy, Herman Cain said he would feel
uncomfortable appointing a Muslim to his cabinet and suggested that communities may
have the right to oppose the building of mosques, and Michele Bachmann (previewing
the rise of Donald Trump) accused American officials, including Representative Keith
Ellison and Hillary Clinton’s aide Huma Abedin, of being Islamic radicals 48.
Trump plays with numbers and sources—as seen with the Jersey City example—
sometimes inventing them completely. For instance, on March 13, 2016 he claimed that
“27 percent of Muslims around the world are very militant,” a “fact” that is unverifiable
given the vagaries of defining the term “very militant” 49. Trump quotes a poll run by
the Islamophobic and tiny Center for Security Policy which found, in an online survey
of 600 supposed Muslims, that 25% of Muslim-Americans believe that violence is
justified as a part of a global jihad. Trump quoted the same poll finding that 51% of
American Muslims “agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being
governed according to Shariah” 50. The numbers Trump quotes are correct. It is the
source that is spurious. The Southern Poverty Law Center states the following:
45
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“Founded in 1988 by former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney, Jr., The
Center for Security Policy (CSP) has gone from a respected hawkish think tank focused
on foreign affairs to a conspiracy-oriented mouthpiece for the growing anti-Muslim
movement in the United States” 51.
As Prashant Waikar writes, Trump repeatedly implies that the source of
terrorism has never been fully understood, saying, for instance, after the Orlando
nightclub attack in 2016 “we must find out what is going on” 52. By examining Trump’s
statements, Waikar finds the obvious answer: “Trump believes that radical Islam is the
sole cause of terrorism,” he even goes so far as to call it a “‘sickness’” 53. Such a view
ignores any structural factors behind terrorism and, in fact, my data on presidential
speeches on terrorism shows that Trump links terrorism to other issues or conflicts
worldwide less than half the time—less than Bush and Obama did 54. When Trump does
link the terror threat to other issues or conflicts he is almost always invoking
immigration or refugees as a threat to America, once again showing how Trump
combines the threats of terrorism and immigration. Of the 36 speeches made where
Donald Trump links terrorism to another issue or conflict, eleven explicitly link the
terror threat to immigration.
[Insert Table 4.1 Here]
In his first two years in office (data runs until February 2019), Trump
dramatically raised the number of annual speeches about the terror threat when
compared to his predecessor. President Trump made 39 such speeches in 2017 and 43 in
2018/9. As a point of comparison, Obama made 135 total terrorism speeches (by the
definition used here of a formal speech where “terror-“ is used three times) in his eight
years in office. In two years, Trump had made 82 such speeches. Trump also
reintroduced the rhetoric of fear that Bush had established, but added to it an
additionally anti-immigrant element. In 2017, other than using the generic term
“terrorist,” Trump was most likely to call America’s adversaries “radical Islamic
51
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terrorists” (he did so in 6 speeches), “evil doers” (he did so 3 speeches), or to link them
to immigrants and immigrant-linked gangs such as MS-13 (he did so in 6 speeches).
Notably, Trump reintroduced the term “evil” when discussing terrorists. As seen in the
last two chapters, George W. Bush had emphasized the term early in his tenure while
Barack Obama had completely abandoned it. In 2018, Trump continued the same trend
calling America’s terrorist opponents “radical Islamic terrorists” in six speeches and
referring to them in connection to immigrants or immigrant gangs such as MS-13 in
eleven speeches. The only mention of evil came in the phrase “evil gangs.”
Trump is rarely tolerant toward Muslims. His predecessors made overtures to
Muslim-Americans and the wider Muslim umma much more regularly in their speeches
on terrorism as Table 4.2 shows. In 29% of his speeches on terrorism, Barack Obama
expressed some form of tolerance toward Muslims or Muslim-Americans. George W.
Bush did so in 13.5% of his speeches about terrorism after 9/11. Yet Trump only
expressed tolerance towards Muslims or Muslim-Americans in 5% of his formal
speeches on terrorism. It should be noted that one of the four speeches where Trump
extends some version of tolerance to Muslims was delivered to a Muslim audience in
Riyadh 55. As Moustafa Bayoumi put it, “The very idea of Trump visiting a mosque
seems ludicrous. Why? Because unlike his predecessors, Trump is best understood not
as a regular politician but as a fundamentally sectarian demagogue. And like sectarian
demagogues everywhere, he aspires not to unity but to division” 56. While perhaps too
much has been made of George W. Bush’s visit to a mosque and call for tolerance
toward Muslims six days after 9/11, especially in light of the wars Bush conducted,
Bayoumi is right. Trump is virulently anti-Muslim. Apropos of visiting mosques,
Trump tweeted the following anti-Obama comment after the nation’s first AfricanAmerican President missed the funeral of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia: “I
wonder if President Obama would have attended the funeral of Justice Scalia if it were
held in a Mosque?” 57 Trump has also proposed that America close down mosques and
monitor Muslims 58. After a mass shooting attack in two New Zealand mosques, Trump
refused to use the words “Islam” or “Muslim” in his prepared response instead
“offering condolences to the nation of New Zealand” 59.
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[Insert Table 4.2 Here]
Islamophobic Actions
Trump’s antipathy to Muslims has had real effects. As Oz Hassan writes, “Once
in office, Trump attempted to actualize these concerns [about Muslims] through the
active securitization of Islam” 60. One of the main planks of this strategy was a ban on
immigration from Muslim countries. Trump justified such a ban for security purposes
given the recent bombings and attacks in Europe as well as in San Bernardino,
California among other places. Trump held that Muslim refugees or immigrants could
be a “Trojan horse” and that what was necessary was to “suspend immigration from
regions” that had historically exported terrorism 61. Trump proposed that once such a
suspension ended, America should begin “implementing an ‘ideological screening test’
for people applying to move to the US in order to ‘screen out any who have hostile
attitudes’ towards the US” and “‘because you don’t know who is who’” when dealing
with Muslim immigrants and refugees 62.
Trump sought to set an anti-immigrant agenda with his rhetoric, linking the
threat of terrorism to immigration, thus producing the threat of the terrorist migrant. As
Waikar traces, Trump sought to link a few key themes to deliver his desired policy goal
of suspending the entry of Muslim refugees into the United States. The themes he
employed were that “radical Islam is the sole cause of terrorism,” that “radical Islamic
terrorism is a global existential threat,” and that “the entry of Muslim refugees and
immigrants to the U.S. is a threat to American security” 63. The first Muslim ban targeted
Muslims from seven countries—Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria—
“banning citizens from these countries for 90 days.” The executive order also
“indefinitely banned Syrian refugees.” The ban “exempted religious minorities in
Muslim-majority countries” making its intent obvious 64. After several court challenges,
Trump released a second Muslim ban this time banning Muslims from five countries for

60

Hassan, “Trump, Islamophobia and US-Middle East relations,” pg. 188.
Waikar, “Reading Islamophobia in Hegemonic Neoliberalism Through a Discourse Analysis of Donald Trump’s
Narratives,” pg. 167.
62
Waikar, “Reading Islamophobia in Hegemonic Neoliberalism Through a Discourse Analysis of Donald Trump’s
Narratives,” pg. 167.
63
Waikar, “Reading Islamophobia in Hegemonic Neoliberalism Through a Discourse Analysis of Donald Trump’s
Narratives,” pg. 154.
64
Hilal, Maha, “Trump’s Year in Islamophobia: Five ways the administration has waged war on Muslims at home
and abroad in its first year,” Institute for Policy Studies, 21 December 2017, https://ips-dc.org/trumps-yearislamophobia/.
61

90 days and Syrian refugees for 120 days 65. Trump’s second Muslim ban was “largely
symbolic” as it targeted five countries (Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia) from
which few immigrants come to the United States66. The current version, upheld by the
Supreme Court in June 2018, restricts the migration into the United States of nationals
from Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, North Korea, and Venezuela. President
George W. Bush, it should be noted, instituted the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System a year after the 9/11 attacks. The system applied extra scrutiny to
nationals from 24 Muslim-majority countries and North Korea 67. Trump’s ban is more
onerous and, with its strange patchwork of countries included, more an Islamophobic
symbol than an effective national security strategy. Further, Trump’s “extreme vetting”
program coupled with a lack of resources given to the FBI to meet his demands has
marooned many Syrian refugees in camps in the Middle East. The Trump
administration admitted less than half as many refugees in 2018 (a little over 22,000) as
had been admitted the year before (45,000) 68.
In terms of violence abroad, Trump’s supposedly isolationist “America First”
strategy has not paid dividends. Trump’s use of drones has increased “over the already
prolific Obama administration,” 69 though how much so is not fully known as Trump
has done away with the need to report on such matters70. It is known that the Trump
administration “carried out 176 strikes in Yemen in just two years, compared with 154
there during all eight years of Obama’s tenure, according to a count by The Associated
Press and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.” Trump’s drone strikes also killed 14
people in Somalia in 2018, 150 people in Afghanistan in the first nine months of 2018,
and between 1,257 and an astounding 7,500 people in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria in just one year 71. Trump also dropped “the most powerful non-nuclear weapon
in the U.S. arsenal” on an ISIS base in Afghanistan 72. Trump’s cynical dealing with the
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Saudis—he agreed to a $350 billion arms deal with them, the largest in U.S. history,
despite their human rights record—facilitated the bombing and siege of Yemen 73.
President Trump’s focus on Muslim terrorists has created a huge blind spot for
far-right white extremists to goose-step through. Trump sought to “rename the
Countering Violent Extremism program to Countering Islamic Extremism—thus
excluding white extremists and solidifying the ‘Muslim threat’” 74. This attempted move
previewed a trend. As Moustafa Bayoumi writes, “[Trump] has doubled down on his
double standard of demonizing Muslim extremists but not white extremists. He has
remained silent on Muslim victims of hatred”75. Bayoumi goes on, “He retweeted three
incredibly incendiary anti-Muslim videos from the extreme right-wing fringe group
Britain First, solidifying his credentials…as the chief propagandist for the international
anti-Muslim movement” 76.
The President’s anti-Muslim rhetoric has had a real effect on the body politic as
well. Muller and Schwarz report that, “the number of weekly hate crimes committed
against Muslims under Trump is twice as high as under Obama and 50% higher than
under Bush.” The authors rightfully note that, “this is particularly striking because
Bush’s term included a temporary 10-fold increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes following
the 9/11 terror attacks—the largest spike since the beginning of the FBI records in
1990” 77. As Rep. Ilhan Omar noted, in a statement that led to Donald Trump tweeting at
her an image of the burning twin towers, “[The Council on American-Islamic Relations]
was founded after 9/11 because they recognized that some people did something and
that all of us were starting to lose access to our civil liberties” 78. Here Rep. Omar is
stating that not all Muslims are to blame for 9/11, a rather obvious point that
unfortunately led the President of the United States to attack her in an Islamophobic
tweet.
Hate crimes against Muslims may be on the rise due to Trump’s permanent
campaign stance. As Dalia Mogahed finds, Islamophobic hate crimes spike during
election campaigns as “bigoted” electioneering rhetoric activates certain elements of the
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public 79. Donald Trump’s demagoguery and tweets provide constant fodder for his
supporters who, it can be surmised, have remained in a “riled up” state due to his
permanent campaign. To wit, Trump has reveled in his supporters calling for him to
“lock up” his political opponent Hillary Clinton, to “send back” (presumably to Africa)
Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, and to “knock the crap” out of protestors at his rallies 80.
Troublingly, Juan Cole notes that, “A recent poll found that some 16 percent of
Americans want to deny the vote to Muslim-Americans, 47 percent support Trump’s
visa restrictions, and a majority would like all mosques to be under surveillance” 81.
President Trump has chosen terrorism, and laws and regulations meant to stop it, as a
central plank in his campaign and presidency. Yet he has focused almost exclusively on
threats emanating from Muslim sources, which he has claimed need to be “looked
into,” while ignoring terrorist attacks orchestrated by non-Muslim Americans including
far-right white extremists. While his statements certainly do not endow Muslims with
dignity, it must be emphasized that his actions are equally malicious.
Rhetoric in Context: Comparing Trump to Obama and Bush
Much has been made of George W. Bush’s olive branch to Muslim-Americans in
the wake of 9/11—specifically a speech he made six days after 9/11 preaching tolerance
toward Muslim-Americans 82. Bush also was careful to separate moderate Muslims from
extremists in his speeches. That said, President Bush also sold a hugely ambitious “with
us or against” war against terrorism that effectively made most of the world’s Muslims
into potential targets83. George W. Bush spoke by far the most about terrorism of the
modern presidents, emphasizing the threat repeatedly. He also fomented fears of
nuclear terrorism that exacerbated public fears arguably unnecessarily 84. His war in
Iraq alone killed about a million people 85—and his torture campaigns broke U.S. laws,
ruined the reputation of America and permanently injured (and, in some cases, killed)
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detainees86. Obama spoke less often about terrorism, as he was mandated to wind
down the policies of 9/11, and did so with much greater tolerance towards Muslims-reaching out to Muslims, for instance, in a major speech in Cairo in 2009 and at the
White House-hosted 2015 Iftar dinner87. However, Obama certainly did not conduct an
ACLU-sanctioned counterterrorism campaign. Obama’s drone strike campaign killed
hundreds of Muslims, including U.S. citizens.
Chart 4.1 displays the frequency of formal presidential speeches about terrorism
after 9/11 (it is the same as Chart 1.1), exhibiting the fact that President George W. Bush
was much more active in selling terrorism policies than Barack Obama was after him.
Despite this fact, as Klaidman emphasizes, Obama conducted a similarly aggressive
counter-terrorism policy to that of George W. Bush albeit with different emphases—
drones over “enhanced interrogation,” Afghanistan prioritized over Iraq, less talk of
“terrorism” or “terrorists” and more covert action.
[Insert Chart 4.1 Here]
To this end, George W. Bush was invested in setting the government’s agenda on
terrorism as the utmost priority and on selling policies such as the Iraq War. Chart 4.2
summarizes data on whether presidents invoked the theme of a worldwide terrorist
conspiracy in their speeches after 9/11. As can be seen below, President George W.
Bush employed this theme with much more regularity than did his successors. He
particularly did so in 2002 when he was selling the Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, in
2006 when he was selling the surge of troops to Iraq at a time when Americans were
growing increasingly weary of the war there 88. Trump and Obama, on the other hand,
did not make the same links as the agenda was already set for them. They could
continue with the policies of their predecessor without having to rally the public, albeit
for Obama with some blowback from his supporters. The worldwide conspiracy theme
faded after Bush 43 left office, but the policies tied to it—such as covert drone strikes
and the global war on terror—remained.
[Insert Chart 4.2 Here]
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As exemplified in Chart 4.3, in President Trump’s first year he harped with great
frequency on the resilience of America’s terrorist adversaries. This theme has waxed
and waned since the 9/11 attacks, but it has been largely present when presidents have
sought to sell counterterror policies such as the troop surge in Iraq and the Muslim ban.
[Insert Chart 4.3 Here]
Chart 4.4 displays the frequency and percentage of terrorism speeches wherein
the theme that the war on terror is a war unlike any other is present. Here we see
evidence of Trump moving away from speech that ratchets up the terror threat.
Interestingly, Trump does not hit with much frequency on many of Bush’s threat
inflationary themes, perhaps due to his “America First” allegedly isolationist stance.
Instead, Trump has been consistent in his coupling of Islamophobia and xenophobia.
[Insert Chart 4.4 Here]
Conclusion: A More Overtly Prejudiced War on Terror
Trump’s agenda is an Islamophobic one. He sells Islamophobic policies. Trump’s
national security policies and the way he talks about them are decidedly Islamophobic.
As Tables 4.1 and 4. 2 showed, Trump has been markedly less tolerant toward Muslims
in his speeches about terrorism and has sought to link the conflict against terrorists to
immigration. The link to immigration is an important one as Trump uses the terror
threat to reinforce his xenophobic stance. With terrorism, Trump not only links violence
to refugees and migrants from majority-Muslim countries but also discusses Salvadoran
gangs in the same light. While Trump does discuss the pitfalls of immigration in nonterrorism themed speeches, in his terrorism-themed speeches the immigrant and the
terrorist are frequently blurred together into one form.
As Charts 4.1 and 4.2 show, Trump speaks more about terrorism than did Obama
and mostly does not link terrorism to any larger conspiracy—seeing it instead as a
curious sickness indigenous to the Muslim world. The Muslim immigration ban, the socalled extreme vetting of refugees from Syria, wanton drone strikes, and even calls for
harming the family members of terrorists and of destroying Iran provide additional
evidence of Trump’s Islamophobia and tearing down of the dignity of Muslims at home
and abroad89. At the same time, as Charts 4.3 and 4.4 exhibit, Trump sees America’s
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terrorist adversaries as resilient but does not seek out a wider-scale war with them.
Trump’s blind spot (maybe a soft spot?) for far-right extremist violence, not to mention
mass shootings, which could be equated with terrorism show the folly of his ways.
An argument could be made that the “end of dignity” outlined here is not
important. After all, hundreds of thousands of Muslims were killed by the
administration of George W. Bush despite his alleged decorum. President Barack
Obama, in a way, one-upped his predecessor by cloaking himself in the Nobel Peace
Prize while murdering hundreds of terror suspects along with innocent civilians in
targeted assassinations—Obama even joked about these policies 90. One might argue
that Trump fits neatly among this pantheon of human rights abusers—with the caveat,
of course, that national security justifies certain military practices.
Yet, Trump’s rhetoric is so corrosive that its effect goes beyond the lies or
excesses of Obama and Bush. Donald Trump speaks freely of his antipathy toward
Muslims and, unlike John McCain who famously corrected a supporter who called
Barack Obama a Muslim 91, Trump trades in the most malicious anti-Muslim
conspiracies including the Obama “birther” myth. Such divisive and hateful rhetoric
tears at America’s social fabric, justifies the hate of the far-right (“very fine people”
according to Trump) 92, and validates the excesses of dictators and oppressors
worldwide. This illiberal turn may not be so different from the “evil versus good”
world dynamic that George W. Bush cynically framed whilst he gathered power for the
executive branch 93. While hate crimes against Muslim-Americans were also rampant
under Bush, amazingly they are higher under Trump 94.
Presidential rhetoric shapes the terror threat, giving everyday Americans an
image of who to fear and an idea of how concerned they should be, with the goal of
affecting legislative and regulatory change. But, under Trump, it does this at the
expense of the rights of American Muslims. President Trump’s rhetoric is certainly
beyond the pale and it is scary for a sitting U.S. President to dissociate himself from a
large ethnic minority group in the country and one of the world’s largest religious
groups. From a national security perspective, this is a conundrum, as U.S. Muslims
have been an asset to the country. Injecting suspicion into their communities could
certainly backfire. There is also certainly no decorum in any of these statements. The
only utility they have is in showing support for anti-Muslim portions of the electorate
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and perhaps in projecting “toughness” as one of Trump’s platforms is not to be cowed
by political correctness or by the world’s various bad actors.
President Donald Trump’s rhetoric is disconcerting for many reasons. It moves the
far-right toward ever-more brazen violence while ignoring their rise. It substitutes the
domestic terrorist enemy with the nearly-nonexistent Muslim foreign terrorist-enemy95.
It erodes ties with countries that might otherwise be helpful in the fight against
terrorism and does the same with American communities and people that might be
essential in that fight. It vilifies a vulnerable minority in America and plays into the
worst stereotypes of the Muslim world. And it does all this in the wake of no great
terrorist threat—ISIS was already on the wane when Trump took office.
Trump’s divisiveness and demagoguery are unparalleled in American history.
While the policies of other modern presidents are not without fault, Trump’s rhetoric is
brazenly anti-Muslim and erodes the values and equality of Americans. His xenophobic
speech has led to an atmosphere where anti-immigrant violence is, if not condoned by
the leader, then at least passively accepted 96. Dignity is what needs to be reestablished
and fought for. A return to presidential rhetoric that acknowledges the dignity of all
Americans would not erase the excesses of the interminable war on terror, but it would
reverse some of the corrosive trends Trump has exacerbated.
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